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GARY J. XANTHOS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
IN THE SUPRE1\1E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 18333 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in favor of Respondent, ruling that the Respondent was not required to tear 
down a dwelling which has been used as such for at least 40 years. 
DISPOSITION - LOWER COURT 
The District Court in this action, in accordance with the provisions of §10-9-15, 
Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended, determined that Salt Lake City and its Board of 
Adjustment had inappropriately, unreasonably, arbitrarily and capriciously required the 
Respondent to tear down a dwelling which had been in existence for 40 years or in the 
alternative, to terminate using the building for residential purposes. The matter had 
come before the Board of Adjustment to appeal a ruling of a City official who required 
such action. The Board of Adjustment failed to relieve the Respondent from the City 
official's order to tear down the building. A timely appeal of the Board of Adjustment's 
denial was filed. In accordance with statute, Respondents filed a "plenary action." The 
Court heard the evidence of the parties and granted the relief sought by the Respondent. 
1 
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In its brief, Appellant states that "The ruling legalized a structure, believed 
originally to have been built as a garage and permitted its continued use as a single 
family dwelling.n (Appellant's Brief p. 1-2). It should be indicated that there was no 
evidence that the dwelling was built as a garage (R.27 4). The evidence before the court 
was that at least since as long ago as 1942, the building has been used as a residence. It 
was further the testimony of the only witness who had personal knowledge of the use of 
the building that in 1942 it was an old building and had never to her knowledge, been used 
as a garage. Further, Appellant incorrectly states that the court "assumed the 
prerogative of independently reweighing and balancing interest." The court followed the 
requirements of §10-9-15 and correctly heard, as is its duty, the ttplenary action for 
relief" filed by the Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent wishes that the ruling of the District Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 18th day of April, 1974, the Respondent's deceased father, James 
Xanthos, applied to Salt Lake City for a building permit to build four duplexes. 
[(Plaintiff's Exhibit 21)]. At that time, the late Mr. Xanthos submitted an application 
which is Appendix 1 to Appellant's Brief, as well as a plot plat, which is Appendix 2 to 
Appellant's Brief and which is also attached to this Brief. Salt Lake City Corporation 
approved said permit. The permit was issued on April 18, 1974. The late Mr. Xanthos 
then commenced construction. Construction was completed in April, 1975. During the 
period of construction, there were at least ten on-site inspections by the City (R. 220). 
During the entire period of time of application and construction, the dwelling in question 
was at the site and was available for inspection. There was testimony from one of the 
building inspectors that the dwelling was noted but the inspectors determined not to 
bother with it. 
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Certificates of occupancy were issued on or about the 23rd day of April, 1975 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13). Certificates of occupancy signify that all City requirements have 
been met and the buildings were occupied. 
The matter apparently came to the attention of the City because Nona Cottle, a 
neighbor, was having difficulty with the tenant then residing at the dwelling. Mrs. Cottle 
stated at the Board of Adjustment hearing that she did not object to the dwelling, but to 
the tenant. 
The trial dealt extensively with trying to determine when the home was built. 
There was undisputed testimony from Mrs. Cottle that in 1942, the home was used as a 
dwelling and that at that time it was not a new structure, but in fact, had an old and 
weathered look (R.203). Further, there was testimony that through the years, the home 
had continued to be used as a dwelling (R.203-204, 215). The Director of Planning and 
Zoning stated (as reflected in the Board of Adjustment minutes) that the building was 
there prior to 1927 when Salt Lake City's zoning ordinances were enacted. 
The City officials testified that there were no known health or safety hazards 
associated with the dwelling and that whether the structure was used as a residence or as 
a garage or storage shed would not affect any health, safety, police or fire requirements 
(R.325, 349 ). 
There was testimony from City zoning officials that the entire parcel of land 
contained sufficient square footage to meet the density requirements for the property 
(R.329). The City officials did state that the configuration of the buildings on the 
property means that the house in question did not have required front, rear and side 
yards, as required by the current zoning ordinances. 
Contrary to the statement on page 3 of Appellant's Brief, pursuant to the Court's 
questioning, City officials testified that there was no emergency access problem or 
problems concerning light or open space (R.325,349). 
3 
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Contrary to the statements on page 3 of Respondent's Brief, there was no 
admissible evidence that the home had once been a garage or that it had been illegally 
converted from use as a garage. The only evidence is that as far as anyone knew, the 
property had been used as a dwelling and was an older dwelling in 1942. 
It should also be noted that appeal to the Board of Adjustment is the only method 
of appeal provided by statute from any illegal, unreasonable or improper order of a City 
building or zoning official. 
It is the City's position that, although it did not notify the late James Xanthos of 
any problem with his planned construction, and although three years had passed since the 
duplexes had been built, and al though there were no com plaints about the building, and 
although there are no concerns about the light, air, fire, police or access, the City has 
the right to require a residence to be destroyed because of technical zoning 
requirem entso 
It is apparent that the City did not care about the existence of the structure at 
the time of approving the plans or during the construction of the duplexes. In fact, the 
City gave no explanation for its tardy interest in the property at all. The City was able 
to give no reason other than the structure's non-compliance with present zoning and 
requirements as to why the residence should be destroyed. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11) 
It would be comical, if not for the sadness of the inordinate expense caused the 
Respondent by the City in this action, to note that the only substantive objection to the 
dwelling is that the tenant is provided with a private garbage collection because he puts 
his garbage in the bin used by the duplexes. A City official speculated that if there was 
a more traditional front yard, then the tenant would be forced to take his garbage to 
Ninth South to have City garbage collection. The City official then speculated that the 
landlord would then save - maybe $5.00 - on garbage collection and would lower the 
re·nt. This analysis provides the only substantive and practical reason for tearing down 
the dwelling (R.394-395). 
4 
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The City never offered into evidence any transcript of the "hearing" at the Board 
of Adjustm~nt. Nor to Respondent's knowledge was a transcript made or available; 
rather, the only document introduced was Appendix 3 which contains the Board's ruling. 
The statute provides that the Board of Adjustment will keep minutes. There is no 
reference to a requirement of keeping a record. 
During the trial, City officials unsuccessfully attempted to justify their lack of 
action prior to the time that the four duplexes were constructed. The Court ruled that 
the actions of the City were unreasonable, capricious, contrary to law, contrary to good 
sense and the building should be permitted to stay, as it had been there for a time which 
probably exceeded the age of anyone participating in this case other than Mrs. Cottle. 
The City's only attempt to justify its prior approval of the construction and plan is 
based on the application of a Stan Conrad, whose identity was never determined. Mr. 
Conrad - the City presumes - filled out the application putting a zero (0) answer to the 
question "number of Wlits now on lot." The application also asked what the previous use 
of the land was. This was answered "vacant." The plan which accompanied the 
application clearly showed an nexisting building" in the upper left-hand corner. The 
obvious explanation is that the area on the property where the duplexes were to be built 
was in fact vacant. In fact, there were no dwellings on the area where the four duplexes 
were to be built. It should be emphasized that Mr. Xanthos did not complete the 
application. He provided the plot plan. Some sub-contractor filled out the form. 
Respondent repeats that the plot plan which accompanied the application clearly shows 
the existing buildings. It should also be mentioned that the existing building was 
available for anybody to see. 
The Appellant incorrectly states on page 5 of its Brief that "The City approved 
the duplex permit based on the assumption that the structure in controversy was not 
going to be used as a dwelling." There was no testimony to that effect whatsoever. 
Appellant also incorrectly states that if the plan had been considered as one to 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accommodate nine units, it would have violated a number of City ordinances. If the City 
had denied the application because of a violation of zoning ordinances, it would have 
been possible for Mr. Xanthos to redesign the layout of the buildings to conform with 
zoning ordinances, as pointed out by Mark Hafey, the City's Deputy Director of Zoning 
(R.327-328). 
Appellant's comments in paragraph 11 of its Brief (p.5) are interesting. In 
paragraph 5, Appellant admits that the building inspectors were aware of the premises 
and discussed it. The Brief recites that a new building inspector testified that he 
informed his supervisor of the existence of the dwelling. The City set no condition or 
requirement concerning tearing down the building, although it was well aware that it was 
there. 
The Appellant incorrectly states in paragraph 12 that there was a misleading 
application. As the trial court correctly found, the actual plot plan shows the existing 
building. The building was also there for anyone to look at. The explanation as to why 
there was an inconsistency was obvious. On the location where the duplexes were going 
to be built, there was no building. That land was vacant. There was in fact, no need, to 
the Applicant's knowledge, to tear down or demolish any buildings in order to build the 
new duplexes. 
The Appellant engages in a discussion of the history of the site. In that discussion, 
Appellant understandably tries to draw conclusions from Appellant's evidence which the 
Court found to be unconvincing. With regard to paragraph 6, Appellant fails to state that 
the City's records virtually did not exist. The lost records and plans, the errors made by 
the City officials in looking for the records, the inaccuracies of the records and the 
inconsistent devotion to enforcement are appalling. For example: 
(1) The City could not find the original permit (R.254). 
(2) The City could not find its authorization to provide power to the 
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dwelling, yet the dwelling had had power for over 40 years (R.250). 
(3) The old records are often missing (R.246-247). 
(4) The City Engineer gave out numbers for an address which had been 
used by Mrs. Cottle for years (R.318). 
(5) The City showed there was no water bill for the home. Respondent 
nevertheless produced a qill he had gotten (R.319,324) (Exhibit 32). 
(6) The supervising building inspector had chronically failed to perform 
his duties (R.240). 
(7) The County Assessor had been assessing a building on the site (Exhibit 
P-16) although the City was unaware of it. 
(8) There was a sewer line which ,serviced the dwelling probably 40 years 
although the City was unaware of it (R.294). 
(9) The City building personnel had not cared about enforcing the zoning 
ordinances (although they were supposed to) at the time of the Xanthos application 
(R.226). 
(10) Normally, when a building is over 40 or 50 years old, the City accepts 
it as non-conforming because of trouble with its record-keeping system (R.234). 
Because City officials did not find a building permit for the dwelling does not 
mean that there was no dwelling. The Court made an express finding of fact that the 
City's records were incomplete and therefore not reliable. The Court correctly found, as 
the evidence showed, that in 1942 the building was being used as a dwelling and was used 
thereafter as a dwelling. Unfortunately, no witnesses were found who could give 
personal testimony as to how the building was used before 1942. We do know that it was 
an old building in 1942 and that it had always been used as a residence (R.203-204, 215). 
Appellant further tries to argue that the structure had not received City 
approval. There was no one to testify to that. The only evidence before the Court was 
Mrs. Cottle's testimony and the incomplete and inaccurate City records. The City 
7 
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attempted to prove that the structure was not used as a dwelling through the use of old 
Polk directories. Mrs. Cottle's detailed testimony of the history of the home and its 
residents was obviously more convincing. The lack of reliability of the old directories 
was apparent. The Polk directory constitutes hearsay evidence. We do not know who the 
Polk personnel were who visited the site nor their degree of energy or devotion to their 
job. We don't know whether they actually spoke to anybody or whether they even visited 
the site. Naturally, a Court would believe the personal testimony of Mrs. Cottle, who 
personally knew the people who lived in the house, versus the incomplete and inaccurate 
City directories. The reliability of the Polk directory was particularly questionable 
because it used different addresses for the same property during different periods of 
time. 
The City officials testified that there is always a need for low cost housing and 
there is a need for low cost housing in Salt Lake City, Utah (R.344,405). The trial court 
further found that the City is in need of low cost housing and that this dwelling did in 
fact supply low cost housing. The Court correctly found that requiring the destruction of 
a building under these circumstances because of front yard requirements was 
unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary and constituted substantial hardship on the 
Respondent. The Court correctly found that requiring the destruction of a dwelling 
under the circumstances in question was unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary and contrary 
to law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE RESPONDENT'S BUILDING SHOULD NOT BE 
REQUIRED TO BE DEMOLISHED. 
It is the Respondent's position that the District Court properly concluded that it 
was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law for the City to require the 
8 
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demolition of the dwelling unit in question. The provisions of §10-9-15 provide that a 
party aggrieved by a Board of Adjustment decision has the right to petition for a "plenary 
action for relief." The trial court correctly heard evidence pursuant to this "plenary 
action." 
The Respondent further contends, in the alternative, that even upon the Board of 
Adjustment record, the trial court correctly found that the City's action in requiring the 
demolition, and the Board of Adjustment's decision in not stopping that City action were 
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. Although the Respondent 
believes that the requirements of §10-9-15 mandate a new evidentiary hearing, even 
under the standard of review advocated by the Appellant, there are sufficient facts to 
show the unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious nature of the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment. It is bewildering, however, to believe that the Legislature would state that 
an aggrieved party has a "plenary action" for relief if what the Legislature meant was a 
"limited right to review", as suggested by the Appellant. 
A 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONDUCTED A 
"PLENARY ACTION" PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED§ 10-9-15. 
The statute at issue governing the appellate jurisdiction reads: 
The City or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board 
of adjustment may have and maintain a Qlenary action for 
relief therefrom in any court of competent jurisdiction; 
provided, petition for such relief is presented to a court of 
competent jurisdiction within thirty days after the filing of 
such decision in the office of the board. §10-9-15 Utah Code 
Ann., (1953.} (Emphasis added) 
The terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous. Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "plenary" as "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified", cit~ng 
Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 191 Olka. 501, 134 P.2d 976 (1942). Collier's Dictionary 
defines "plenary" as meaning "full, cqmplete, entire, absolute, unqualified." (Page 931.} 
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Subs ti tu ting the words complete, absolute and unqualified for "plenary" in the 
statute would lead to a reading that a person aggrieved may have and maintain a full, 
complete, absolute, unqualified action for relief. This is hardly the interpretation which 
the defendant suggests. The defendant suggests that the action be limited to the review 
of the Board of Adjustment record, that this review be limited to whether the Board of 
Adjustment action was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. If the Legislature 
intended for there to be a limited review of an administrative record, why was the phrase 
"plenary action for relief" used'? 
The Legislature in other statutes has used the phrase "an action" for "plenary 
review". This court in Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415 (1981), in interpreting its prior 
decision in D. & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 98 Utah 438, 100 P .2d 
455, said that since the word "review" was used the aggrieved party in that action was 
entitled to a "trial upon the record made before the lower tribunal" without the 
submission of new testimony. And the court further stated that because of the use of the 
word "review" the court's review of the record would include fresh consideration of 
questions of fact as well as questions of law. In Pledger v. Cox, the court noted that "de 
novo" has two possible interpretations. It can mean a complete retrial upon new 
evidence or a trial upon the record before the lower tribunal. The court noted that what 
trial de novo meant was dictated by the wording in the context of the statute, the nature 
of the administrative body, and the procedure being reviewed. 
In this case the only "record" which the Board of Adjustment produced was its 
decision. To the Respondent's knowledge, there was no record made. There was no court 
reporter present. The only "record" is the decision which is attached to Respondent's 
Brief as Appendix 1 consisting of two typewritten pages. The Board of Adjustment 
statute requires the Board to keep minutes, not a record. Although the Board of 
Adjustment records on tape the proceedings of each board hearing, the taped recordings 
are erased after 90 days. 
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The Board of Adjustment is not structured to provide the type of record that 
would be required should Appellant prevail. The Board is composed of volunteers who 
meet twice monthly for a few hours. A copy of the Board of Adjustment morning agenda 
is attached hereto as Appendix 2. The procedure before the Board is informal, is limited 
in time, and its entire method of proceeding would have to be changed in order to provide 
the formalities and a record which would make a limited review practical. This change in 
procedure would be required not only in Salt Lake City but in every city and county in 
the State of Utah. It surely makes sense to permit the informal, inexpensive, fast 
procedure which currently exists to remain in effect. This allows the Board of 
Adjustment to hear numerous cases in just a short period of time. In comparison, a full 
record with full cross examination would have resulted in a trial of two full days. If the 
only record is truly to be made before the Board of Adjustment, instead of hearing 
numerous cases as it did the morning that the Xanthos matter came before it, the Board 
of Adjustment would have to become a full time body, meeting every day of the week, all 
day long. 
The Court is well aware that administrative bodies which do make a record have 
extensive hearings. The Legislature wisely determined to let the Board of Adjustment 
remain small, efficient and fast. Only those parties particularly aggrieved will take their 
case to court. 
The City is requesting an interpretation of §10-9-15 which not only belies the 
section's plain meaning but would put a financial burden on every city and county in the 
State. This would be an enormous expense on a regular basis to satisfy due process 
requirements that a record sufficient to be reviewed be created. Respondent 
respectfully suggests that no such interpretation of the statute is required by this court. 
In Denver and R. G. W. R. Co. v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 Utah 
2d 105, 287 P .2d 884 (1955), this court in reviewing a different statute analyzed review 
requirements absent a specific statutory standard. The court concluded that in light of 
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the fact that there was no record to review, there would be a denial of due process if the 
reviewing court could not get at the facts. The court stated: 1'To hold otherwise, invites 
rule by men, not laws. . . . n4 Utah 2d at 11 O. The court held that where, as here, there 
is no record to review, nthe judiciary may awaken to question their warrant, and in doing 
so, may receive, examine and weigh evidence, if necessary, as it did here on stipulated 
facts, to the end that due process guarantees will maintain." 4 Utah 2d at 109. 
The court concluded: 
We believe the record made by the commission and certified to 
the district court so lacking in information and fact as to have 
justified the district court in receiving evidence to determine 
whether the claimed property would or would not be benefited 
directly by the improvement, and having done so and found 
there would be no such benefit, there being substantial 
evidence to justify such conclusion, we will not disturb the 
judgment. If, under the particular circumstances of this case, 
there could have been no inquiry into the facts other than 
reflected in the commission's record, we are of the opinion the 
respondents would not have been afforded the constitutional 
guarantees of the due process clause. 4 Utah 2d at ll I. 
The issue of the scope of judicial authority occurs in other areas of state 
administrative law, with comparable statutes. In such statutes, the district court is 
given the specific authority to hear evidence regarding the issue previously tried in an 
administrative tribunal. The appeals provision of the Utah Operator's and Chauffeur's 
License Act, for example, (Utah Code Ann.. §41-2-1 .!:.! seq.) (1953) provides for a 
statutory trial de novo. The appeal statute reads: 
..• such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be 
its duty to set the matter for hearing on a ten days written 
notice to the department and thereupon take testimony and 
examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether 
petitioner is entitled to a license. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-20 
(1953). 
This statute has been construed to confer appellate jurisdiction on the district 
court from the decision of the Department of Public Saf etys Division of Drivers Licenses 
and Accident Records. In McAverney v. State Department of Public Safety, 9 Utah 2d 
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191, 341 P.2d 212 (1959), this court determined that the district court could not merely 
review the department's action but must try the case de novo. In that case, a driver's 
license was revoked by the Department of Public Safety and the holder of the license 
appealed the revocation decision to the district court. The district court reviewed the 
Department decision and affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded, finding that the 
statutory provisions provided for a trial de novo: 
It appears that the lower court may have misconceived its 
duties and responsibilities under the provisions of §41-2-20, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953. Under the provisions of this statute, it 
was the duty of the court to hear the case de novo, and not 
merely as a review of the action of the Department • • . We 
feel, and so hold, that the court was required to take 
testimony, and examine into the facts, and make its own 
independent determination as to whether the appellant was 
habitually negligent driver, and whether his driver's license 
should be suspended. 9 Utah 2d at 194. 
In considering the same statute recently, this court rested validation of a 
challenge to the de novo provisions of . the drivers license statute on general 
administrative law. This Court, presented with the identical challenge to the de novo 
provisions of that statute, considered the scope of appellate review over administrative 
provisions and affirmed the statute providing for a de novo trial: 
This interpretation of trial de novo affords the party who was 
about to suffer from administrative action a closer judicial 
scrutiny than a mere review of the record of agency action, 
and we think this preferable in view of the seriousness of the 
administrative action and the relative ease with which the 
limited factual issue can be subjected to retrial in the district 
court. Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415 (1981). 
The aggrieved party in the instant action, Respondent before this Court, is in the 
same situation. The seriousness of the impact of an adverse decision upon Respondent 
was considered by the trial court and is well documented in its record. The limited 
nature of the factual issue lent itself well to judicial resolution and was properly 
considered by the lower court. The guidelines of Pledger v. Cox affirm the validity of 
the district court's actions in the instant case. None of the "parade of horribles" posited 
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by the Appellant in their Brief has resulted from the extension of plenary review over 
administrative agencies in other areas. 
Other jurisdictions provide for plenary, or full and complete, review of various 
zoning decisions in district or other superior courts. In such jurisdictions where the 
statute has been at issue, appellate courts have determined that the appropriate standard 
of review for the court is for the lower court to take additional testimony or weigh the 
relevant facts. 
One such instance is Glasgow v. Beaty, 476 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1970), a case where the 
facts closely resemble those of the instant case. In the Glasgow case, a municipal 
administrative officer refused to grant an occupancy permit for a dwelling that was 
determined to have insufficient off-street parking. That denial was appealed to the 
Board of Adjustment, which affirmed the decision of the administrator. The decision was 
further appealed to the district court, which, after a trial de novo, reversed the Board of 
Adjustment decision and granted the variance. 
The appeal from the Board of Adjustment was taken pursuant to Okla. Stat. §44-
110 which reads: 
(A) An appeal from any action, decision, ruling, judgment or 
order of the Board of Adjustment may be taken by any person 
or persons jointly or severally aggrieved • . . (D) The appeal 
shall be heard and tried de novo in the district court. All 
issues in any proceedings under this section shall have 
preference over all civil actions and proceedings .•• (F) The 
district court may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or 
modify the decision brought up for review ..• 
The Supreme Court, correctly applying the terms of the statute, ruled: 
Appeals from Board of Adjustments created pursuant to 11 
O.S. 1961 §401 are to the district court and the cause is there 
tried de novo. On a trial de novo, on applications for 
variances, the burden of proof rests on applicant . • . . 476 
P.2d at 78. 
This statutory construction was recently affirmed by the Oklahoma Appeals Court 
in the decision of Whitcomb v. City of Woodward. Considering another instance where a 
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The granting or denial of a variance is within the sound 
discretion of the municipal zoning officials and the Boards of 
Adjustment. Melton vs. City of Durant, 521 P .2d 1372 (197 4). 
Appeals from the decisions of the Board of Adjustments are to 
the district court and the cause is tried de novo. These 
proceedings are equitable in nature. Therefore, the scope of 
review in this court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court, but rather to determine whether the trial court 
has abused its discretion. Unless clearly against the weight of 
the evidence, the judgment of the trial court will not be 
disturbed. 616 P .2d 455 (Okla. App. 1980). 
The Oklahoma statute closely resembles the Utah statute in that it outlines a 
complete and detailed appellate procedure for the judiciary to follow where zoning 
matters are at issue. It does not merely posit the remedy of "appeal" for those aggrieved 
with the decision of the Board of Adjustment, but enlarges and defines the nature of the 
remedy. Similarly, the Utah statute does not provide merely for "review" but provides 
for an "action for plenary relief.'' 
Massachusetts is another state which provides for plenary proceeding at the 
appellate level. The governing Massachusetts statute provides: 
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Appeals 
may within twenty one days after the decision is filed in the 
office of the City or town clerk, bring a petition in the district 
court within the judicial district where the land area to be 
affected is situated •.• the court shall hear all evidence 
pertinent to the authority of the board and determine the facts 
and, upon the facts as so determined, annul such decision if 
found to exceed the authority of such board, or make such 
other decree as justice and equity may require. Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 40A, §21 (West 1977). 
Construction of the statute has been similar to that of the Oklahoma statute, even 
though the explicit provision for a de novo review was absent. As the Massachusetts 
court explains, the statutory provisions encompass a full scale evidentiary hearing: 
We are aware that there was some controversy at the time the 
findings were made in the instant cases as to the duties of the 
judge hearing such an appeal, but the statute has since been 
fully and carefully considered ••.• It is now plain that it is the 
duty of the judge to determine the facts for himself upon the 
evidence introduced before him and then apply the governing 
principles of law and, having settled the facts and the law, to 
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inspect the decision of the board and enter such decree as 
justice and equity may require in accordance with his 
determination of the law and facts. Devine v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals of Lynn, 322 Mass. 319125 N .E.2d 131 (1955). 
Other jurisdictions concur that the interpretation of their statutory appellate 
review may be plenary in nature. Alabama1, Florida2, Arkansas3, New Hampshire4 are 
among the states that provide for a de novo review of zoning adjustment decisions. Case 
law from these jurisdictions, with statutes similar to that of Utah, provide a more 
accurate indicia of the law than do cases from jurisdictions with substantially different 
legislative mandates. 
Appellant's reliance on the case of Williams v. Zoning Adjustment Board of the 
City of Laramie, is misplaced. As explained above, in most zoning cases, the scope of 
review is determined by statute. The Wyoming appellate procedure outlined by Wyoming 
Code §15-626 only provided for an "appeal" which the Wyoming Court deemed ref erred to 
a process by which judicial review was to be accomplished. The Utah statute does 
notmerely require an "appeal" it requires a "plenary action for relief." Absent the 
qualifying term "plenary," or any other clarifying term, the Wyoming court determined 
"appeal" only encompassed the power to remove a cause from an administrative to a 
judicial tribunal. Respondent submits that to impose such an interpretation upon the 
Utah statute would be to def eat the intent of the Legislature to provide for a 
comprehensive judicial relief through the promulgation of §10-9-15. Further, Appellant's 
contention that §10-9-15 should be linked in some manner to Rule 65(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is unsupported by either reason or authority. The specific statutory 
(1) Board of Zoning Adjustment of Hueytown vs. Warren, 366 So.2d 1121 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1978) 
(2) Union Trust Company vs. Lucas, 125 S.2d 582 (Fla. App. 1960) 
(3) City of Little Rock v. Leewood Property Owners Ass'n., 272 Ark. 451,413 S.W.2d 877 
(Ark. 1967) 
'.4) Vogel vs. Board of Adjustment for City of Manchester, 92 N.H. 195, 27 A.2d 105 (N.H. 
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contention that §10-9-15 should be linked in some manner to Rule 65(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is unsupported by either reason or authority. The specific statutory 
procedure is not intended to be diluted by the limited review provided by extraordinary 
writs. 
B 
THE AffiENCE OF RECORD IN THE 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT PROCEEDINGS 
MANDATES A PLENARY ACTION 
The requirements for Board of Adjustment hearings are set forth in §10-9-8 of the 
Utah Code Annotated. The Board is not required to maintain a transcript of the 
proceedings before it; instead, it need only: 
. . • keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each 
member· on each question, or if absent or failing to vote, 
indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations 
and other official actions; all of which shall be immediately 
filed in the office of the board and shall be a public record. 
§10-9-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
Again, Appellant relies on case law that is inapposi te to the instant case. The 
case of Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 
1976) did not involve either a zoning issue or a board of adjustment proceeding. Rather, 
the dispute arose out of the County Commission's revocation of Respondent's 
massage/health studio license. Respondent's appeal thus reached the district court 
through the County Commission, under an administrative appeal procedure that bears no 
resemblance to that provided by §10-9-15. It is significant to note, however, that in 
Peatross, this Court affirmed the responsibility of the district court to exercise its 
appellate review power to maintain supervisory control over inferior tribunals. 
Peatross also establishes a standard by which the grant of plenary review to t~e 
district court may be evaluated. This Court articulated that standard: 
The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the authority 
to review the actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal upon 
the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify, or 
reverse such action or judgment. 555 P.2d at 284. 
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Absent such a record, however, the district court is required to conduct a plenary 
review, re-evaluating the evidence to come to its own decision. This action was 
recognized and explained in the case of Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. vs. Central Weber 
Sewer Improvement District, 4 Utah 2d ll O, 287 P.2d 884 (1955). In that case, the Weber 
County Commission conducted a hearing to determine the creation of a water and sewer 
taxation district. Respondent utilities owned real and personal property within the 
district which they felt should be excluded from the tax base since it would not be 
benefited directly by the sewer services. Respondents appealed the County Commission's 
decision to tax the property to the district court. On review, the district court accepted 
evidence and heard witnesses. Appellants to the Supreme Court, the Commission, 
claimed error, contending that district court review was limited to an examination of the 
record made by the County Commission. 
This Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that absent a statute to 
the contrary where there was an adequate record, that record alone is the proper basis 
for review. However, the court continued: 
But where, as here, there is nothing to review but an ipse dixi.t, 
due process would be denied if the reviewing court could'IlOt 
get at the facts. To hold otherwise would invite a rule of law 
by men, not laws, and would lead to such absurd results . . . 4 
Utah 2d at 11 O. 
The necessity of a comprehensive record of the proceedings before a Board of 
Adjustment for adequate appellate review on the record was explained by the North 
Dakota Supreme Court in the case of Shaw v. Burleigh County, 286 N. W .2d 792 (N .D. 
1979). The North Dakota high court interpreted the North Dakota statute which 
provides: 
All a~p~als taken from decisions of a Board of County 
Comm1ss1oners shall be docketed as other cases pending in the 
district court and shall be heard and determined de novo. N .D. 
Cent. Code §11-11-43. 
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In holding that such an appeal required plenary review in the district court, the 
court determined: 
From an evolutionary standpoint, we have allowed the district 
court to hear testimony, receive exhibits, and make a decision 
as it would in any trial, without regard to the findings and 
decisions of the Board of County Commissioners. Berger v. 
County Commission, 275 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1979). The 
practical reason for allowing the district court to proceed in 
this manner is that there is no complete record of the 
proceedings. before the board. The proceedings at the county 
agency level are not transcribed. 286 N.W.2d at 796. 
(Emphasis added) 
Absent a complete certified record which the district court could utilize for 
review purposes, the district court must conduct a retrial on the issues, considering in 
many cases substantially the same evidence as was before the Board of Adjustment. 
Appellant's contention that the confirmation of this power in the district court 
will transform it into a super board of adjustment is conclusory and unfounded. Such a 
contention ignores the successful use of this procedure in numerous other states (supra) 
and within other review provisions in Utah administrative statutes. 
c 
THE LOWER COURT EXERCISED PROPER APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION OVER THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE BOARD. 
In the alternative, acceptance of the standard of review forwarded by Appellant 
also supports the decision of the trial court. In finding that the action of the Board of 
Adjustment was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law, the trial court evaluated 
essentially the same evidence as the Board of Adjustment. The sketchy facts outlined in 
the minutes provide compelling reasons for the grant of the variance to Mr. Xanthos. 
Testimony before the Board demonstrated more than ample evidence to support a 
grant of the variance on the grounds of unnecessary hardship and special circumstances. 
The Board of Adjustment was informed that the building had been built prior to 1927 and 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had been a dwelling for a substantial period of time. The Board also found, "In looking at 
the plans, it was assumed that the building was an accessory building; but the building 
inspector should have noted the problem when inspecting the property." (Findings and 
Order; case number 7928; Plaintiff's Exhibit 12). The Board determined further, "It was 
noted that the certificates of occupancy were issued for the duplexes ••• these problems 
should have been caught when the ~uplexes were inspected." (Id, at 2). The facts alone, 
as the trial court correctly indicated in Finding of Fact 21, constitute special 
circumstances sufficient to grant a variance. 
Evidence of unnecessary hardship was also considered by the Board and was 
properly before the trial court on appeal. A neighbor indicated she was not disturbed by 
the house per se, but only the occupying tenants. Mr. Xanthos indicated that the problem 
could be remedied. There was no evidence presented to the Board indicating reasons the 
property should be brought into compliance. Concerns about fire access, garbage 
collection, and other health and safety concerns were not raised before the Board, and 
under the City's standard, could not have been presented before the trial court. 
Hardship to the owner was presented to the Board of Adjustment. The minutes of 
the meeting recorded that, ". • • the dwelling provides low income housing and is 
necessary for the economic feasibility of the duplex project." (Id). No contrary evidence 
was presented to the Board of Adjustment, and the Board never addressed the hardship 
imposed by the City on Mr. Xanthos by the destruction of the dwelling. 
Appellant contends incorrectly that the trial court established itself as the City 
Board of Adjustment. Respondent did not substantially deviate in its contentions before 
the trial court that the City was estopped from enforcement of the zoning ordinances 
through the actions of numerous City officials; that the City's failure to note a zoning 
violation for a substantial period after the construction bars any enforcement of zoning 
laws; and that special circumstances and conditions of unnecessary hardship justify the 
authorization of a variance for nonconforming use. After an exhaustive inquiry into the 
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evidence supporting these contentions, the trial court adjudged the request for a variance 
to be proper. 
The trial court should not serve as a rubber-stamp authority for the Board of 
Adjustment. In the instant case, the trial court properly conducted a plenary action for 
relief from the Board of Adjustment's decision. In doing so, the court considered the 
same substantive issues that were before the Board and determined the Board's decision 
to be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. 
D 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN FAILING TO GIVE PRESUMPTIVE WEIGHT 
TO THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S DECISION 
Appellant contends that zoning decisions are universally given presumption for 
purposes of judicial review. As should already be clear, the degree of weight given to 
administrative zoning decisions varies from state to state and is governed by statute. 
Additional considerations for purposes of judicial review are the nature of the 
administrative zoning decision and the basis upon which that decision rests. 
Cases cited by Appellant in support of its position are distinguishable. As noted 
supra, the Williams case was governed by a different type of statute, resulting in the 
application of substantially different principles of law. The Williams court itself notes 
that the review of exceptions and variances to zoning statutes is governed by its own 
state statute. 
Equally distinguishable are cases involving re-zoning decisions. Zoning changes 
are legislative action in which ordinances are amended. The cases do not involve an 
interpretation of §10-9-15. Furthermore, as court review of legislative action, the 
standard of review is significantly different. An example is a case cited by Appellant, 
Cottonwood Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 493 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P.2d 138, (Utah 1979). That case involved the rezoning of an area for a multi-family 
dwelling and not the issuance of a variance for an already extant nonconforming use. 
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 306, 410 P .2d 764, (1966), also relied 
upon by Appellant, considered an even more extensive zoning change to permit an 
expansion of commercial development into a residential neighborhood. 
Reference to other state practices reveals a lack of uniformity in the weight 
given to the Board of Adjustment decision in a variance case. In Massachusetts, under 
the statute described supra, at p. 15: 
The decision of the Board is no more than the report of an 
administrative body and on appeal has no evidentiary weight. 
In the superior court, the appeal is heard de novo. The decision 
of the board cannot be treated as a report of an auditor, a 
master, a commissioner, an assessor, or some other judicial 
officer in the usual course of judicial proceedings. Devine v. 
Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynn, 332 Mass. 319, 125 N .E.2d 
131 (Mass. 1955). 
Alabama addresses the same rule under their statute granting plenary review to 
the circuit court: 
Any party aggrieved by any final judgment or decision of such 
Board of Zoning Adjustment may within fifteen days thereafter 
appeal therefrom to the circuit court by filing with such Board 
a written notice of appeal specifying the judgment or decision 
from which the appeal is taken. In case of such appeal, such 
Board shall cause a transcript of the proceedings in the action 
to be certified to the court to which the appeal is taken, and 
action in such court shall be tried de novo. Alabama Code §11-
52-81 (1977). 
The purpose of the certified transcript was explained by an Alabama appellate 
court in 1978: 
In view of the type of proceedings to be had in the circuit 
court, lf!e are unable to perceive the efficacy of certifying the 
transcript of the Hue own Board of Zonin Ad·ustment 
Proceedings to the c1rcw t court ot er t an to perm1 a better 
understanding of the issues before the circuit court. . . . 
Furthermore, we are convinced that the transcript would have 
no evidentiary value in view of the de novo type hearing to be 
conducted in the circuit court. Board of Zoning Adjustment of 
Hueytown v. Warren, 366 So.2d 11_21 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978). 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ABSENT 
A FINDING IT ACTED IN AN 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS MANNER 
The Peatross case, supra, outlined the proper scope of review available to this 
court in considering the appropriateness of the action of the district court. Only upon a 
showing that an action was as "capricious and arbitrary", will the decision of the lower 
court be disturbed. There was no such demonstration of either of these factors in the 
instant case, nor does the Appellant contend any such abuse occurred. When an issue has 
been committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, that discretion will not be 
infringed upon unless it is shown that the discretion exercised therein has been abused. 
Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, (Utah 1976). 
Under §10-9-15, that discretion is clearly placed in the power of the trial court. 
A Pennsylvania court, in considering a zoning appeal from the lower court, articulated 
the standard applicable in the discrete area of zoning: 
Where additional evidence is taken and the court decides the 
matter de novo, our review is limited to a determination of 
whether the Court committed an error of law or an abuse of 
discretion. Overstreet v. Zonin Hearin Board of Schu kell, 
49 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 412A.2d169 Pa. Cmwlth 1980. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concurred in this view, indicating: ". . . the 
judgment of the district court will not be reversed unless clearly against the weight of 
the evidence." Board of Adjustment of Oklahoma City v. Shaunbour, 435 P.2d 569 (Okla. 
1968). 
This Court has recognized that in matters of equity before it, such as the instant 
case, deference will be given to the position of the trial judge who sees and hears 
witnesses and considers all the evidence before the trial court. 
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While it is the responsibli ty of this court to review the 
evidence in equity cases, it will not disturb the findings of fact 
made below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous and 
against the weig'ht of the evidence. In conduc~ing our review 
of the evidence, we are, of course, mmdful of the 
advantageous position of the trial judge who sees and hears t.he 
witnesses, and we are constrained to give due. deference to its 
decisions by reason thereof. McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996 
(Utah 1978). 
The two volumes of records and numerous exhibits attached indicate that the 
district court carefully considered all of the facts in the instant case. The lower court 
properly considered the public interest em bodied in the zoning plan and the special 
circumstances attached to the property of the Respondent. It heard testimony from 
numerous witnesses over the period of the two day trial, and the Appellant was given 
ample opportunity to prosecute its case before the court. 
POINT III 
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL 
WERE PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
An ingredient which cannot be ignored in this case is the basic unfairness and 
waste which a ruling in the City's favor would create. At the time that the late James 
Xanthos applied for and received a building permit, during the entire period of 
construction and inspection, through the period of inspections which led to the issuance 
of a certificate of occupancy, and for approximately three years thereafter, Salt Lake 
City did not object to the design of his project. As Mark Hafey, the Deputy Director of 
Zoning stated, it would have been possible to design the addition of four duplexes on this 
parcel of land without necessitating the destruction of the dwelling unit in question. 
In an analogous situation, this court in discussing the issue of estoppel in zoning 
cases, stated: 
In our view, the tests employed by most other jurisdictions 
tend to subject land owners to undue and even calamitous 
exp~nse. because of. changing City councils or zoning boards or 
their dilatory action and to the unpredictable results of 
burdensome litigation. 
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The economic waste that occurs when a project is halted after 
substantial costs have been incurred in its commencement is of 
no benefit either to the public or to land owners. In a day 
when housing costs have severely escalated beyond the means 
of many prospective buyers, governmental action should not be 
based on policies that exacerbate a severe economic problem 
without compelling justification. Governmental power should 
be exercised in a manner that is reasonable and, to the extent 
possible, predictable. Western Land Equities Inc. v. City of 
Logan, 61 7 P. 2d at 395. 
The court went on to indicate that where problems arise which seriously threaten 
public heal th, safety or welfare, the interests of the public should nonetheless be 
protected. The court indicated that a property owner should be able to develop his 
property with a degree of assurance that the basic rules will not be changed in 
midstream. 
The Xanthos family has been victimized by lost City records, ahanging personnel, 
lack of diligence, negligence and a belated change in policy and attitude resulting from 
changing personnel in the Salt Lake City Building Department. The loss to the Xanthos 
family is clear. An income producing dwelling will be destroyed. The loss to Salt Lake 
City is clear. Low cost rental housing will be needlessly destroyed. The City officials 
have testified that there are no safety, health, welfare, fire or access problems. The 
only governmental concern mentioned was the proximity of the garbage container to the 
dwelling's tenant and whether the cost, if any, had been added to the tenant's rent. It is 
perhaps an understatement to say that this governmental concern should be considered 
minor rather than serious. 
The position of this court with regard to zoning estoppel rests on a substantial 
foundation of prior case law, both in this jurisdiction and in other states. 
The instant case is a clear example of good faith reliance. James Xanthos, father 
of the deceased, submitted all of the requisite forms which complied with the City's 
requirement for building approval. As the trial court found in Finding of Fact number 15: 
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The plot submitted as part of the original building application 
for four duplexes by the plaintiff's deceased father, James 
Xanthos, showed that there was an existing building on the 
site .... 19. Although the application made no reference to 
the single family dwellings, the inclusion of the building on the 
olot olan was sufficient disclosure by the applicant to place the 
City" on reasonable notice to make further inquiry about the 
existence and use of the building. 
The District Court's findings clearly indicate that the regular application 
procedures were pursued and were substantially complied with. (See Exhibit P-1) 
Consequently, the approval of the building permits gave grounds for Mr. Xanthos to 
pursue his development. 
Furthermore, the configuration of the four duplexes on the lot evidences good 
faith reliance on the part of Mr. Xanthos. Again, the trial court's findings indicate "The 
gross square footage of the property would accommodate, based upon minimum area 
requirements, four duplexes in a single family dwelling if properly designed." (Finding of 
Fact number 9) It is important to stress that throughout the application period, the 
construction of the duplexes, and for a substantial period of time following the 
completion of the duplexes, there was no intimation by the City that the permit had been 
erroneously issued. Mr. Xanthos had no way of finding out potential problems, and there 
can be no dispute that he proceeded in good faith upon the representations made by the 
City that he was in compliance with their requirements. 
Similarly, there are numerous acts by the City which induced Mr. Xanthos' 
reliance. Beginning with the approval of the initial application until the Board of 
Adjustment hearing, there is an unbroken series of acts by the City which permitted and 
encouraged the construction of the duplexes. Again, the trial court finding supports the 
fact that there was actual inducement on the part of the government which caused Mr. 
Xanthos to act. For example, Finding of Fact number 19 indicates that the placement of 
the dwellings on the plat was sufficient notice to the City. The City's failure to make 
any further inquiry is a manifest omission upon which Respondent was entitled to rely. 
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Mark Haf ey testified similarly that even had there been a problem with square 
footage, it might have been possible to obtain a variance for a dwelling behind the 
duplexes. Such variances are common throughout the City (R. 328). This point alone has 
been the basis for a finding of estoppel in similar cases involving lot setbacks and 
minimum lot sizes. See Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976), and 
Wood v. North Salt Lake, 15 Utah 2d 245, 390 P.2d 858 (1964). Furthermore, as Mr. 
Blair, the Director of the Building Department testifed, the City normally does not 
enforce rules against buildings 40 to 50 years old. 
Moreover, there is the failure of the numerous City building inspectors, who 
repeatedly visited the site, to make any protest with regard to the dwelling. As the trial 
court noted in Finding number 17: 
City building inspectors went to the site at least five times 
during the course of construction. The structure was 
observable to the inspectors, and one of the City inspectors, 
Marvin Peguillan, observed the building and inquired about it, 
but none of the inspectors followed through with removing the 
building from use or availability for use as a dwelling. 
At trial, the head of the City building department testified that for a project of 
this type, there must have been at least 10 inspections from four different people in 
order to receive final approval (R. 220). Not one of these people objected or otherwise 
brought to Mr. Xanthos' attention the nonconforming placement of the duplexes. If the 
nonconforming use is obvious and offensive to public safety and health as is claimed by 
Appellant, the failure of City representatives to note the dwelling becomes confounding. 
The City went further and issued certificates of occupancy for the completed 
structures (Exhibit P-13), another clear affirmative act upon which Mr. Xanthos could 
rely. The Finding of Fact by the trial court indicates, 
18. The City issued certificates of occupancy for the four 
duplexes. There was no evidence or record of any 
communication of conditions or stipulations restricting or 
concerning the use or removal of the structure as a single 
family dwelling. 
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Through the certificates of occupancy, the City certified i_ts final and absolute 
approval to a development which it encouraged through all stages of planning and 
construction. Finally, the length of time the structures were allowed to stand 
unchallenged constitutes an affirmative act or omission as contemplated by this court in 
Western Equities upon which Mr. Xanthos was entitled to rely. 
In evaluating the potential loss to owner, the court determined 1'The proposed 
solutions of removal or change in use would eliminate a dwelling which is clearly 
habitable and which has and is being put to valuable use." Finding of Fact. The court 
continued: 
11. Elimination of the unit also creates an economic hardship 
for the plaintiff in this action by imposing an unnecessary loss 
of $150.00 per month. 
As was indicated in the record, the economic standing of Xanthos is such that the 
$150.00 rental income from the dwelling is necessary for him t<?-. break even on the 
development (R. 147)$ Thus, the loss of the dwelling as a rental unit would have serious 
financial impact on the Respondent. 
Contrasted against the financial hardship of the Respondent is the minimal or 
nonexistent interest of the City in having the structure removed. The court makes the 
balance in Finding 13 by noting "Continuation of the use as a dwelling in this case will 
not substantially affect the comprehensive plan of Salt Lake City. Whereas strict 
enforcement will cause unnecessary hardship for tenant and owner, without furthering 
the general plan." The court underlined the weakness of the City's position by correctly 
finding: 
The solutions of modifying the building to some accessory or 
auxiliary use or demolition would result in no improvements or 
enhancement of safety requirements, traffic circulation, air 
space, or the health, safety or morals of the community. 
Finding of Fact number 8. 
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Indeed, in the instant case, public policies regarding the provision of low-income 
housing would be retarded by the removal of the dwelling from the housing pool. (Finding 
number 10) (R-44, R-405). Clearly, placing the case at bar into a balancing test to 
determine substantial reliance results in a finding for Respondent. 
In summary, the trial court found correctly for Mr. Xanthos when it determined ·as 
a matter of fact that "The imposition of the strict enforcement of the zoning ordinance 
upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general purpose of the zoning 
plans and the comprehensive plan in the City." [emphasis added] 
The question must be asked, when is a citizen safe from a change in City 
personnel, different interpretations of ordinances, or changing policies? Should not a 
citizen be entitled to rely on a building permit? Should not a citizen be permitted to rely 
on a Certificate of Occupancy·? If these municipal actions cannot be relied on, why are 
they issued? 
rv 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
A VARIANCE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-12(3) 
§10-9-12(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953), together with judicial interpretations of that 
section, support the trial court's position in granting a variance. Appellant's argument 
misstates the case law of zoning variances in Utah, because that argument omits a major 
factor in the granting of zoning ordinances. The general rule for the granting of zoning 
. variances in Utah was set forth in Walton vs. Tracy Loan and Trust Company: 
In other words, if in a specific case the enforcement of a 
regulation according to its strict letter would cause 
unnecessary hardship and the Board can, by varying or 
modifying the application of the regulation obviate the 
hardship and at the same time fully effectuate the spirit and 
purpose of the ordinance, they are authorized to do so. 92 P .2d 
724, 728 (Utah 1939) 
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The statute authorizing the Board of Adjustment to grant variances outlines several 
criteria, all of which were addressed by the trial court, by which the grant of a variance 
should be evaluated. 
The first criteria set forth by the statute is unnecessary hardship. In finding that 
this element existed in the instant case, the trial court found that: 
8. The solutions of modifying the building to some accessory 
or auxiliary use or demolition would result in no improvements 
or enhancement of safety requirements, traffic circulation, air 
space, or the health, safety or morals of the community. 
Thus, no public interest whatsoever is served by the denial of the variance to Mr. 
Xanthos. Further, the gratuitous destruction of. the dwelling would impose a loss to both 
the community and to Mr. Xanthos. The loss of a dwelling unit would exacerbate an 
acknowledged shortage of low income housing in the City and would impose a severe 
hardship on Mr. Xanthos. Consideration of these two factors amply justifies the variance 
authorization. The trial court determined: 
11. Elimination of this unit would cause a hardship to a tenant 
who would be deprived of a habitable dwelling at a relatively 
low cost of $150. 00 per month. 
12. Elimination of the unit also creates an economic hardship 
for the plaintiff in this action by imposing an unnecessary loss 
of $150.00 per month. 
Appellant contends that financial considerations are never to be taken into 
account in determining the issue of practical difficulties and unnecessary hardship. This 
contention is both absurd and not supported by Utah case law or decisions from other 
jurisdictions. Ultimately, all hardship can be reduced to economic terms. To ignore the 
economic consequences of a zoning decision would be to ignore the very foundation upon 
which modern zoning law rests - the maximization of land use through municipal 
regulation. Appellant's own case of Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 
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(1959), reh. den. 282 N.Y. 681, 226 N.E.2d 811, utilizes the phrase "reasonable return", a. 
concept that is measured economically. Furthermore, Appellant fails to forward any 
alternative measure by which unnecessary hardship could be evaluated. 
The general rule recognizes the validity of the integrating financial considerations 
and zoning decisions and is stated in 58 Am.Jur. "Zoning", p. 1053, §207: 
In determining whether to grant a variation of the application 
of the zoning restriction to a particular piece of property, it is 
proper to take into consideration the availability or suitability 
of the property for conforming use, and the imposition by such 
use of financial lo$ on the owner of the property by 
depreciation in value or income. Indeed, there are several 
decisions to the effect that a case of unnecessary hardship may 
be established by showing that the premises in question cannot 
be made to yield a reasonable return if used only for a 
conforming use, or that the premises are not adapted to a 
profitable conforming use. 
Prominent zoning authorities agree: 
A zoning board of appeals may grant a variance upon the 
ground of "unreasonable hardship" if the land cannot yield a 
reasonable return if only used for a purpose allowed in that 
zone and the plight of the owner is due to unique 
circumstances and not to general conditions in the 
neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the 
zoning ordinance itself and the use to be authorized will not 
alter the essential character of the locality. Yokeley, Zoning 
Law and Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, §138, p. 336. 
Utah law has recognized the importance of considering financial factors in the 
decision of whether or not to grant a variance. In Gibbons and Reed Company v. Salt 
Lake City, 19 Utah 2d, 431 P .2d 559 (1967), this court was presented with the problem of 
granting a variance to the operators of a gravel excavation site. The City sought to 
enforce certain zoning ordinances which would have prohibited the use of the piece of 
property for a gravel quarry. The court, in affirming the trial court's decision to allow 
the use of the contested land to continue, indicated: 
Thus, after considering all the factors involved, including the 
existing use of the property, the availability of a natural 
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resource the severe loss to both the fee owners and the public 
as comp~red to the relatively small inconvenience to owners in 
that neighborhood, we conclude that there is evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's decision that the zoning 
ordinance enforced against the plaintiff's property is an invalid 
exercise of the police power. 19 Utah 2d 329, 335. 
The court took specific notice of the economic consequences of the zoning 
ordinances on the gravel pit owners. It contrasted this economic hardship against the 
consequences to the general public and found that the zoning ordinance worked an 
nunnecessary hardshipn on the property owners. 
The lower court was not of the op1mon that the gravel 
operations would have any substantial adverse effect upon the 
value of other property in North Salt Lake. In fact, there was 
testimony at the trial that because of the influence of 
industrial activity in other gravel pi ts surrounding the 
subdivision on the south and east, and the highway, commercial 
areas, and industrial activities on the north and west, the 
excavation on parcel D would not adversely affect the value of 
the subdivision. Conversely, if such an ordinance were 
allowed, the record indicates that the fair market value of 
plaintiff's property would be reduced from $86,000.00 to 
approximately $39,000.00. In addition to that, the plaintiff 
would be unable to utilize sand and gravel deposits of a value 
approximately one million dollars. 19 Utah 2d at 334. 
This court should follow the better reasoned rule of the consideration of financial 
consequences in evaluating the unnecessary hardship to the Respondent when deciding 
this case. 
Appellant also contends that the grant of a variance to Mr. Xanthos confers upon 
him a special privilege. Respondent fails to see, and Appellant to explain, the nature of 
this "special privilege." Respondent seeks no special privilege; it only seeks to retain the 
present configuration of the property, a configuration assented to and approved by 
numerous City officials. 
Similarly, Appellant's contention that the Respondent seeks a more profitable use 
of the property is unsupported by the record. As the property owner noted, he is "barely 
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breaking even" on the property as it is currently being used (R.147). The record and facts 
clearly demonstrate that the Respondent will suffer the loss of enjoyment of a 
nsubstantial property right" through the demolition or conversion of the existing dwelling. 
Finally, Appellant fails to muster any convincing support for its contention that 
the grant of this particular variance will result in a flood of variance applications and the 
collapse of the zoning plan of Salt Lake City (Brief of Appellant, p. 45). Such an 
overstatement ignores the unique characteristics of the instant case recognized by the 
trial court: 
21. There are special circumstances attached to the property 
covered by the application which do not generally apply t-0 
other properties in the same district including, but not limited 
to: (a) the age and occupancy of the dwelling; (b) the approval 
by the City of the development of the duplexes and the 
issuance of certificates of occupancy for the duplexes; and (c) 
the failure of the City to inform James Xanthos that the 
dwelling would not comply with zoning ordinances thereby 
failing to give him the opportunity to redesign the layout for 
the duplexes in such as way as not to require the demolition of 
the dwelling. 
These special circumstances, and the increased vigilance of the City over its own 
zoning authorization procedures, should suffice to ensure the continued viability of a 
comprehensive m Wlicipal zoning plan. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court found correctly that the decision of the Board of Adjustment was 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Utah statute grants a Respondent in such 
action a plenary appeal, a remedy which was pursued in this case. Given the unique 
circumstances of this case, the unnecessary financial loss imposed upon the property 
owner, and the fact that the City approved the project several times, the beneficial 
effect of the low income housing, the absence of any adverse effect on the community, 
the trial court correctly found the dwelling should not be demolished. The record clearly 
supports the decision of the court. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
F~INGS A...'fD ORDER, CASE NO. 7928 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION: 
This is an appeal by Gary J. Xanthos for a variance to legalize a single-family 
dwelling at 1610 West 900 South Street on a lot with a newly constructed duplex 
which causes the dwelling to not have frontage on a dedicated street, without the 
required side and rear yards, and without the required off-street parking in a Resi-
dential "R-2'' District. 
Cary Xanthos was present together with Richard Rappaport of 66 Exchange Place. Also 
present was Nona T. Cottle of 1616 West 900 South. Mr. Jorgensen explained that the 
single-family dwelling located on the rear portion of the lot was evidently built 
some time prior to 1927 and may have been a garage originally situated right on the 
alley. If it was built prior to 1927 it was built before there was any zoning. In 
1974 a permit was taken out for four duplexes plus carports. The plans indicated an 
existing building on the lot but it was not marked as a dwelling. In looking at the 
plans, it was assumed that the building was an accessory building; but the building 
inspectors should have noted the problem when inspecting the property. It would be 
permiasable to have an accessory building behind the duplexes but not a dwelling. 
If it would have been known that it was a dwelling the duplexes would never have 
been permitted to be constructad in front of it. Every building has to face on a 
dedicated street. Even if a building is situated way in the back of the lot with 
room for another dwelling, one could not be constructed in front of it because it 
would make either the building in the front illegal or the building in the rear il-
legal. L&ura Landikusic presented the original plans and penait• whic..i.i indicate no 
dwelling on the lot at that time. The applicant who filed for the pennit stated 
that the property was vacant. It was also noted that the carports were not con-
structed in accordance with the plans the building permit was issued on. The car-
ports were to he detached directly off the alley but they are attached with the 
rear area blacktopped instead of landscaped. Mr. Rappaport explained that James 
Xanthos was the owner of the property at the time of construction but is now de-
ceased. Mr. Rappaport stated that he understood that the building was a dwelling 
at the time the duplexes were constructed. He forther stated that the dwelling pro-
vides lov-income housing and is necessary for the economic feasibility of the duplex 
project. Ha further stated that he doesn't knov of any complaints. Mr. Rappaport 
explained that if the deceased had knovn of the violation at the time he applied for 
the -?ermit he could have arranged a different plan but ,the property was Jnspected by 
varioua inspectors and nothing waa said. Mr. Rappaport feels that at the time of 
construction there was no intention of violating the law; a proper ?arm.it was ob-
tained. 
Nona Cottle who owns the adjacent property stated that as far as she knows the house 
was occupied when the duplexes were constructed but Mr. Xanthoa~did put in some new 
wiring and put new siding on the house although he told her he wasn't supposed to. 
She explained that the house has no foundation under it and was built from the in-
side out. She is not in opposition so much to the house being there but to the pre-
9ent occupants. They bring in a lot of traffic and noise. The blacktopping of the 
alley leading to the house was also discussed. It was brought out that there are 
many older homes in the City that don't have foundations but the house should be in-
spected for other violations. Mr. Xanthoa stated that the tenant in the house could 
be changed if that would make it more acceptable to Ms. Cottle. It was also noted 
by the Board that there are soma junk cars by the house that should be removed. Mr. 
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Xanthos waa informed that he is responsible for the tenants and so he i• responsible 
for getting the cars removed. Later in the meeting the various aspects of the caae 
were reviewed. It was noted that certificates of occupancy were issued for the du-
plexes. The single-family dwelling haa no rear yard and insufficient side yards. 
There is no record of a modified plan being filed for the alterations from the orig-
inal ?lans for the duplexes. These problems should have been caught when the du-
plexes were inspected. The violation was brought to the attention of Building and 
Housing from another department in the City. The small house has to be either re-
moved or legalized. Al Blair explained that the building inspector ~ually doesn't 
look at the permit, he refers to the plot plan. The Board felt that some of the 
blacktop in the rear yard should be removed and landscaping installed. It was noted 
that the carports are legal although they are not built in the configuration indicated 
on the original plans. 
From the evidence before it and after further consideration, it is the opinion of 
the Board that the granting of the requested variance would be inimical to the best 
interest of the district and contrary to the spirit and intent of the Zoning Ordi-
nance since the Board could find no unusual condition attached to thia property which 
would deprive the owner of a substantial property right or use of his property, since 
the building permit indicated that there were no dwellings on the property and since 
no evidence vaa presented which would justify the requested variance. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the requested variance be denied and the violations 
corrected wi&::hin 30 days • 
Action taken by the Soard of Adjustment at its meeting held Monday, February 26, 1979. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah. this 12th day of March, 1979. 
Vice Chairman 
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NOTICE I c:aser;ro. 7933 at 2'02 N 0 T I C E I S HE RE BY Elizabeth Street In application 
GIVEN ltlat !tie Board of Ad- of Garv M. Nagle dba Nagle 
iustment on Z!111il19 of Salt Lake Construction Company for a 
Cltv, Utah, will at its meeting to ~~~~ti~a~ ~rd 7~ A:t ~t!a=.,:Y.it ~1.'gt"if 1f4 ! ~proximately 2600 Elizabeth 
Citv & Countv Building, con- j Street eliminating a p0rtlon of 
sider the following appeals with : the apartment units and replac-
resr>ec:t to the enforcement of 1 ing them with a r~reational 
!tie Zoning Ordinance and IT IS l vehicle oarklng area and man-
HEREBY REQUIRED THAT l .aoement office building for the 
EACH CASE UP FOR HEAR·'. apartment condominiums 
ING WILL BE PRESENTEO : which requires Board of Adiust· 
.4.NO ARGUED BEFORE THE ment approval in a Residential 
~~ATR ~ Eo~ AfJ.}'ST.r~N~ ____'.'.~~:;·"'°~~at the northeast 
PETITIONER OR BY AN AU· corner of 2100 South and Oow-
THORIZED AGENT. IF REP- las Streets in aoollcation of 
RESENTED BV AN AGENT. OOnald PanUShka and 0. c. 
THE AGENT MUST HAVE And~ for a permit to con-
WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION struct a bank and office build· 
FROM THE OWNER. CASES ing witbout the required set· 
WILL BE DISCUSSED BV, bac:ktromOou91asStreet,wHh-
THE BOARD AFTER THE out !tie required ten foot land-
HEAR I NG.. .. . _ . ..; scaoect buffer, without tM re-
Case No. 7928 at1610 West900 Quired off-street oartd119 in a 
Souttl Street In appl!cat!4'1' M Commercial "C-3" District and 
Garv J. Xanthos tor a variance ; for a si:ieclal exceotlon to the 
to leoJallze a slngle-famflv dwel· ordinance to permit the two-
11"9 on a lot with a newly level ?arking structure at 2027 
constructed duplex which Oou91as Street which requires 
causes the dwellifl9 to not have Board of Adlustment approval 
:f~:r ~ ~=~~J~r:~ _il1<!ai:e"tm~.t11~1~~~~;s•r~rin 
rear vards, and without the previous meeting. at 1"60 Am-
required off-street parking in a bassador Way in application of 
Residential "R-1" District •... J Arun V. SidWal to leQallze a 
Case No. 79'1.9 at 82' East grade change bevond the oer-
a.. __,,. ·' South. Temp11e Street and 823 mitted two feet allowed at 
../ ~ { 17~- ) Hanover Place in application of prai>ertv line, contrary to the 
White Rock Mot. Comoany tor a provisions of the ZoniM Ordi-
>oeclat exception to ttie ordl· nance in a Residential ''R·l" 
.iance to oermit a parking lot In District. 
a Residential "R-6" Oistrlct - - C-ase rlo:----,.,.r,t ··over .from 
which requires Board of Adiust- previous meeting, at 651 East 
ment approval. . __ 100 South Street in application 
Case No. 7930 at 520 North 800 Of Odyssey . House by Louise 
~• /,/? West Street in application of Lund.eeef'9, a19ent. for a permit · LL ( 'I ~·•. ) Paul M. Savage for a oermit to to change a conditional use construct a detached ;araae from a nursing home to an 
and storage area which would Odyssey Adolescent Center, 
excaed the Permitted 720 which has been located at 134 
SQuare feet of area allowed tor "H" Street, which re<luires 
auxillarv buildings in a Resi· Board of Adlustment approval 
dential."R-2" District. in a Residential "R-0" District. 
Case No. 7931 at ffie sou~·- Case No. 7Q.IO . ..:.. reoP8ned ~ . 
west corner of Cheyenne and at 927 South 900 East Street in 
~ 300 South St1"4tts in application application of Wayne A. Kl119 
/.h.a, ... -;t.t-1__ ( ~- ) g~,,-Js~~ o~~:fv!,~r~~: ~%i~a~i:~ ~~:i'1t~~n atg ~ 
ment building without the re- isting group home consisting of 
<:1uired off-street parking in a ei!;lht semi-indes>endent adults 
Residential "R-6" District. which requires Board of Adiust-
Case Ro~ "793rat 649 bnxen · ment aoproval in a Residential 
Court in application of Lowell "R·4" District. 
Groberg for a oermit to con- A L L P E ~ S 0 N s·· I N • 
stnJct a triplex which 'NOUld TERESTEO IN BEHALF OF 
have only partial frontage on a OR IN OPPOSITION TO ANY 
dedicated street and without OF THE APPLICATIONS 
the required rear vard and !tie WILL BE GIVEN AN OPPOR-
oarking for which WOUid be in TUNITV TO BE HEARD AT 
the required front vard and THE MEETING THERE. 
would not maintain the re- Dated at Salt Lake Cit-1. 
quired design standards in a Utah, this 17th-day of Februarv. 
Residential "R·SA" District. 1979. 
- MILDRE£>G. SNIDER· 
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